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BY THE POWER VESTED IN ME? LICENSING RELIGIOUS
OFFICIALS TO SOLEMNIZE MARRIAGE IN THE AGE OF
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
ABSTRACT
State recognition of same-sex marriage has presented significant new
challenges to the law of religious freedom under the First Amendment. For
example, all states license religious officials to solemnize civil marriage, a
ceremony required for a valid marriage in all states. Could a state that has
recognized same-sex marriage require its licensed religious officials to
administer their licenses in such a way as not to discriminate against same-sex
couples? Or would such a law violate the free exercise rights of that licensed
religious official? Or, conversely, is the very practice of state licensing of
religious officials to solemnize and enact civil marriage an impermissible
establishment of religion in violation of the Establishment Clause?
This Comment argues that (1) the Free Exercise Clause, as currently
interpreted, does not protect licensed religious officials from a law forbidding
them to discriminate against same-sex couples and (2) the typical marriage
solemnization ceremony by a licensed religious official violates the
Establishment Clause.
This Comment also presents several solutions to remedy these paradoxical
outcomes under the law. First, as to the Free Exercise Clause issue, this
Comment proposes both statutory and judicial remedies that would exempt
licensed religious officials from laws that prohibit discrimination in exercising
marriage solemnization licenses. Second, as to the Establishment Clause issue,
this Comment proposes narrow time, place, and manner restrictions on
religious weddings and consecrations of civil marriages that would remedy the
Establishment Clause violation without requiring states to strip religious
officials of their licenses to solemnize civil marriage.
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INTRODUCTION
State recognition of same-sex marriage has presented significant new
challenges to the law of religious freedom under the First Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution. For example, all states employ sophisticated and nuanced
marriage licensing regimes that license religious officials to solemnize civil
marriages, a ceremonial act required for a valid marriage in all states.1 A
growing number of states have recognized same-sex marriage while protecting
their LGBT citizens from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.2
But, in those latter states, some religious communities and officials refuse to
marry same-sex couples.3 Many same-sex couples regard this refusal as
discrimination.4
Could a state require its licensed religious officials to administer their
marriage licenses in accordance with the state’s nondiscrimination laws, and
remove their licenses to marry anyone if they refuse? Would such a
requirement violate the First Amendment free exercise rights of the religious
official or of the official’s religious group? Such a law could force decisions by
religious officials similar to those of Catholic churches in Illinois,
Massachusetts, and Washington, D.C., which terminated their adoption
services once those jurisdictions passed laws forcing the Church to consider
same-sex couples as potential adoptive parents.5
Alternatively, could a state go further and simply forbid religious officials
to perform marriages altogether as a mandate of the First Amendment
Establishment Clause? The Establishment Clause forbids certain delegations of
government authority to religious officials as a violation of the principle of
separation of church and state.6 Yet state regimes that license religious officials
to enact civil marriage appear to do just that: delegate government authority to
religious officials.
1

See infra notes 13−16.
See infra notes 26−27.
3 See, e.g., Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Considerations Regarding Proposals to Give
Legal Recognition to Unions Between Homosexual Persons, VATICAN.VA (June 3, 2003), http://www.
vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20030731_homosexual-unions_
en.html.
4 See, e.g., Steve Siebold, Legalize Gay Marriage—Discrimination Is Not Christ-Like Behavior,
HUFFPOST GAY VOICES (May 31, 2012, 4:19 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steve-siebold/legalize-gaymarriage_b_1560370.html (“The opposition to gay marriage is all about control and power . . . .”).
5 See Laurie Goodstein, Bishops Say Rules on Gay Parents Limit Freedom of Religion, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
28, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/29/us/for-bishops-a-battle-over-whose-rights-prevail.html.
6 See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126–27 (1982).
2
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Has a state created an impermissible establishment of religion when it
licenses religious officials to solemnize civil marriages—an unconstitutional
condition now finally exposed by the conflicts over same-sex marriage? If so,
all state-given licenses would therefore need to be stripped from men and
women of the cloth. Is this the beginning of another brave new world—the
disestablishment of marriage?
This Comment’s answer is no. Instead, this Comment first argues that
while the Free Exercise Clause, as currently interpreted, does not entitle a
religious official to discriminate against same-sex couples in the administration
of his or her license according to his or her conscience, other legal remedies,
based on statutes and judicial exemptions, can offer that protection. Second,
this Comment argues that the typical solemnization ceremony by a religious
official does violate the Establishment Clause, but remedying this violation
does not require the removal of all solemnization licenses from religious
officials. Instead, the implementation of narrow time, place, and manner
restrictions that distinctly separate the civil and spiritual components of a
religious wedding ceremony is all that is required. In coming to these
conclusions, this Comment thus recognizes and navigates the peculiar tension
presented between the two Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.7 On the
one hand, the Free Exercise Clause urges the protection of religious officials in
the exercise of their licenses. On the other hand, the Establishment Clause
urges that those licenses be taken away.
In preserving the status quo of state licensing of religious officials to
solemnize civil marriage, this Comment does not adopt a strict separation of
church and state approach. A strict separationist approach in marriage argues
that no religious officials should be licensed to marry couples whatsoever,
leaving legal participation and authority over marriage exclusively in the hands
of the state.8 Churches would be free to have their own ceremonies, governed
according to their faiths, but their ceremonies would carry no legal relevance.9
Strict separationists argue that this is either (1) constitutionally required by the

7 See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004) (“These two Clauses . . . are frequently in
tension.”).
8 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Afterword to SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING
CONFLICTS 189, 206 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008).
9 This system would resemble that of Germany. In Germany, civil marriage may only be enacted by a
civil registrar, and separate religious ceremonies have “no legal effect under German law.” See AFTER
SECULAR LAW 316 (Winnifred Fallers Sullivan et al. eds., 2011) (internal quotation mark omitted).
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Establishment Clause or (2) the simplest and most effective solution to our
current debates over marriage.10
Responding to the first argument, this Comment demonstrates that the
Establishment Clause does not require the adoption of a strict separationist
approach. Instead, this Comment shows that while the typical religious
wedding ceremony does violate the Establishment Clause, narrow time, place,
and manner restrictions on such ceremonies are all that is required to remedy
the violation. These narrow restrictions would require two separate ceremonies
at two different times and places, so as to distinctly separate the civil and
religious aspects of marriage.
More significantly, however, as to the second argument, a strict
separationist approach does not adequately appreciate the interests of religious
individuals and communities in having civil marriages solemnized by officials
of their faith. Not only do many religious adherents believe that marriage
encompasses both spiritual and civil responsibilities, but the solemnization of a
religious couple’s wedding by an official of their faith has deep spiritual
significance for the individuals being wed, the officiate, and the larger
religious community. Thus, the wedding solemnization by a religious official
represents both of these commitments and beliefs, spiritual and civic. To adopt
a strict separationist approach is to do harm to this understanding of marriage
for all three of these religious actors. Indeed, it is to harm the very exercise of
their religion.
For example, for the religious individuals being married, the opportunity to
have their marriage solemnized by an official of their faith is not merely a
matter of convenience; it is a spiritual recognition of the multifaceted and
powerful commitments that come with their marital vows. For the religious
official who marries them, it is not merely a matter of pride or power; it is the
opportunity to make sacred even the civil responsibilities of marriage for his
congregants and to impress upon them the weight of the institution. Likewise,
for the larger religious community, it is not merely a matter of tradition; it is
the commitment to an understanding of marriage and citizenship that helps to
define and hold together that very community. A state should thus not trammel
these interests, these acts of faith, absent a clear constitutional mandate, and no
such mandate exists.

10

See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 8, at 206.
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This discussion of what marriage means to a particular religious
community implicates a larger issue, one also tremendously relevant to this
Comment (particularly in Part III concerning the Establishment Clause
inquiry). That larger issue concerns the nature, or ontology, of marriage.
Marriage is not merely a contractual agreement, created and ended by the state;
for many it is also a sacred institution—a divine covenant or sacrament.
Indeed, for many, the spiritual responsibilities and commitments of marriage
subsume their temporal counterparts. The work of Joel Nichols and others
bears witness to the importance of this spiritual aspect of marriage alongside
its secular and temporal aspect.11 It therefore cannot be said that marriage is
one or the other, temporal or spiritual, contract or covenant; it is by its nature
an amalgamation of the two. This means that it cannot be decided once and for
all whose understanding of marriage will govern. And as stated above, this
Comment demonstrates that both understandings of marriage can coexist under
the First Amendment without resorting to strict separation.
To arrive at these conclusions, this Comment will proceed as follows: Part I
begins by surveying the landscape of states’ current regulation of marriage and
their regimes licensing religious officials to solemnize civil marriage. Part I
also explores the historical role in marriage of religious officials on behalf of
the state. This historical survey is crucial to the Establishment Clause inquiry,
which often entails an analysis of whether a certain practice has been such a
longstanding cultural or historical practice so as to become part of a larger
civic custom of society.12
Part II starts by summarizing the developments in state recognition of
same-sex marriage and of antidiscrimination statutes based on sexual
orientation, as well as state statutes designed to protect the free exercise rights
of religious officials in solemnizing marriages. These statutory frameworks
provide the basis for the Free Exercise and Establishment Clause tensions
described above. Part II then explores whether licensed religious officials
could seek an exemption through the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause
from a state law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in
the exercise of marriage solemnization licenses. This Comment argues that, as
11

See MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT: MULTI-TIERED MARRIAGE AND THE
BOUNDARIES OF CIVIL LAW AND RELIGION 5 (Joel A. Nichols ed., 2012); see also Fredric J. Bold, Jr.,
Comment, Vows to Collide: The Burgeoning Conflict Between Religious Institutions and Same-Sex Marriage
Antidiscrimination Laws, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 180–96 (2009) (discussing the religious nature of marriage
and the multifaceted nature of religious activity).
12 See discussion infra Part III.D.
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currently interpreted, the Free Exercise Clause provides no such protection.
Such a law would likely be found to be a neutral law of general applicability,
thus allowing no free exercise exemption to its requirements.
Part III explores whether state statutory provisions licensing religious
officials to solemnize civil marriages are an impermissible establishment of
religion in violation of the First Amendment Establishment Clause. As will be
shown, the Establishment Clause prohibits certain delegations of government
authority to religious officials.13 Specifically, it prohibits a fusion of religious
and governmental functions.14 Though the state licensing statutes do not
establish a religion, this Comment argues that the ubiquitous conflation of
governmental and religious functions by a religious official at a typical
wedding ceremony does violate the Establishment Clause’s prohibitions on
impermissible delegations of governmental authority.
Part IV examines the possible solutions to the First Amendment Free
Exercise and Establishment Clause problems presented in this Comment.
Because the Free Exercise Clause does not protect a religious official’s right to
discriminate against same-sex couples in the administration of his or her
license, objecting religious officials must therefore rely on statutory or judicial
exemptions from any laws prohibiting such discrimination, either at the state or
federal level. Moreover, while some state religious freedom statutes provide
piecemeal protection, this Comment argues that the best and most efficient
source of statutory protection for abstaining religious officials should come
from a federal statute. Such federal legislation should include protections for
the conscience of licensed religious officials and from civil, criminal, and tax
liability for their refusal to solemnize same-sex marriages. However, in the
absence of statutory exemptions, this Comment argues that religious officials
and communities should be able to avail themselves of judicially crafted
exemptions in the form of the ministerial exception most recently articulated in
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC15 and the
expressive association doctrine in Boy Scouts of America. v. Dale.16
Ultimately, these more corporate free exercise and associational rights provide
licensed religious officials with the freedom to exercise their solemnization
licenses according to their individual faiths.

13
14
15
16

See Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 127 (1982).
See id at 126.
132 S. Ct. 694, 714–15 (2012).
530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000).
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Next, to remedy the establishment problem from Part III, Part IV proposes
narrow time, place, and manner restrictions on the solemnization of marriages
by licensed religious officials. These restrictions will focus on dividing more
clearly the separate governmental and religious functions of marriage. By
requiring two separate ceremonies, in two separate places, at two distinct
times, and prohibiting spiritual language in the civil ceremony, these
regulations will ensure that there is no longer a fusion of governmental and
religious functions in the solemnization of marriages by licensed religious
officials. This regime also accurately represents the dual nature of marriage, as
both a civil and spiritual institution. Part IV ends by addressing the potential
legal challenges to these regulations based upon the ironic burdens such
regulations place on free exercise rights and their possible excessive
government entanglement with religion.
Finally, the Conclusion of this Comment explores the implications of its
findings for legislatures, the law, and objecting religious communities. As the
Conclusion will make clear, the First Amendment Religion Clauses make
competing claims on the religious official licensed to solemnize civil marriage;
though the Free Exercise Clause, as currently interpreted, does not provide
religious officials with the protection to solemnize only those marriages that
their faiths allow, other statutory and First Amendment exemptions do. At the
same time, narrow time, place, and manner regulations are required to remedy
the Establishment Clause violation caused by religious officials solemnizing
civil marriage in such a way that creates a fusion of governmental and religious
functions.
I. LICENSING RELIGIOUS OFFICIALS TO SOLEMNIZE CIVIL MARRIAGE
A. State Regulation of Marriage
Marriage is regulated principally by state, not federal, law. This provides
for remarkable diversity in laws regulating the requirements of a valid
marriage and who may legally solemnize a civil marriage.17 However, every
state extends a license, an authorization by law, to solemnize a wedding to only
a specifically defined group of people.18 In several states, solemnizing a
wedding without statutory authorization is a violation of the law and is subject
17 For a comprehensive survey of state statutes authorizing individuals to officiate weddings, see Robert
E. Rains, Marriage in the Time of Internet Ministers: I Now Pronounce You Married, but Who Am I to Do So?,
64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 809, 842–77 (2010).
18 See id.
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to a penalty.19 Moreover, in almost every state, a solemnization ceremony is
necessary for a valid marriage.20 Typically, states authorize religious officials
and governmental officials, such as justices of the peace, to officiate marriage
ceremonies.21 As mentioned above, these state licensing regimes form the basis
for the Free Exercise and Establishment Clause issues discussed below.
B. History of Religious Solemnization of Civil Marriage
The role religious officials play in solemnizing civil marriage has been in
place in America since its colonial beginnings.22 As early as 1694, religious
officials were allowed to solemnize civil marriages alongside local
magistrates.23 In Anglican colonies, the law expressly declared the children of
marriages performed by religious officials outside the established church to be
illegitimate.24 Thus, while initially a feature of state religious establishments,25
since the American Revolution, states have allowed religious officials of all
denominations to participate in the solemnization of civil marriage, including
Catholics and Jews who have been denied other rights.26
Religious solemnization of civil marriage continued uninterrupted after the
disestablishment of religion by the states, and the practice was not raised in the
debates surrounding the adoption of the individual state constitutions or the
federal First Amendment Religion Clauses.27 Nor did the issue arise in debates
over the meaning of the Establishment Clause in state or federal
19 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-22 (2013) (“All marriages attempted to be celebrated by [persons
not found in the statute] are void.”); IOWA CODE § 595.11 (2014) (imposing a $50 penalty on marriages
solemnized by individuals not authorized to do so in the statute).
20 See Adam Candeub & Mae Kuykendall, Modernizing Marriage, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 735, 747,
753 (2011) (“Except for the handful of jurisdictions that recognize common law marriages, all states require
those seeking marriage to perform some type of procedure that is relatively uniform but often oddly
burdensome.” (footnote omitted)); see also, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1 (2013) (requiring solemnization in
the presence of a minister or magistrate); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 7 (2011) (“All marriages must be contracted
by a formal ceremony performed or solemnized . . . .”).
21 See Rains, supra note 17, at 842–77.
22 MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA 76 (1985).
23 Id.
24 Michael W. McConnell, Establishment at the Founding, in NO ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION:
AMERICA’S ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 45, 53 (T. Jeremy Gunn & John Witte, Jr. eds.,
2012).
25 See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1438–39 nn.157–58 (discussing the licensing of dissenting faiths in colonies with
Anglican establishments).
26 See GROSSBERG, supra note 22, at 76.
27 See id.; infra note 29.
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constitutions.28 The early Republic did see notable public controversies over
the propriety of official proclamations establishing specific days for fasting,
prayer, and thanksgiving, and whether or not the mail should run on Sundays.29
Likewise, religious teachers and exercises in state public schools, in addition to
state funding of religious private schools, raised similar objections.30 By 1833,
every state in the Union had eliminated taxes tolled to support its clergy,31 and
later nineteenth-century cases challenged the scope of government support for
religious social services.32 But in the midst of all this controversy over the
meaning and application of the disestablishment of religion, religious
solemnization of civil marriage remained unchallenged.33
The absence of any controversy over this issue in the past could mean that
no public official thought of this role of the religious official as problematic
under the Establishment Clause. Or this issue could have never crossed the
minds of the Founders and the first generation thereafter. Whatever the reason,
this history will prove important when the Establishment Clause question is
taken up in Part III.
II. CLERGY FREE EXERCISE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. State Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage
At the time of publication, either through statute, judicial decision, or ballot
initiative, seventeen states and the District of Columbia have recognized the
rights of same-sex couples to marry.34 Corresponding with this recognition,
many states (most of which have not recognized same-sex marriage) have
amended their state civil rights acts to protect their citizens against

28

See GROSSBERG, supra note 22, at 76; infra note 29.
See Daniel L. Dreisbach, Defining and Testing the Prohibition on Religious Establishments in the
Early Republic, in NO ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION, supra note 24, at 252, 261–66.
30 See Steven K. Green, The “Second Disestablishment”: The Evolution of Nineteenth-Century
Understandings of Separation of Church and State, in NO ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION, supra note 24, at
280, 294–99.
31 See Thomas C. Berg, Disestablishment from Blaine to Everson: Federalism, School Wars, and the
Emerging Modern State, in NO ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION, supra note 24, at 307, 311.
32 See id. at 315–32.
33 See supra notes 27–32.
34 FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states/ (last updated Dec. 20, 2013); see, e.g.,
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2009) (recognizing same-sex marriage through statute); Goodridge v. Dep’t of
Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (adopting same-sex marriage via judicial decision).
29
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discrimination in employment and in public accommodations on the basis of
sexual orientation.35
Recognizing the tension between a citizen’s right to be free from
discrimination and the authority of religious officials to solemnize civil
marriage, most states that have recognized same-sex marriage have enacted
legislative protections for religious officials who would refuse to marry a
same-sex couple.36 Depending on the state, these statutes include a
combination of the following protections: no religious official shall be
compelled to solemnize any marriage against his or her conscience; a refusal
will not affect a church’s property tax exempt status; and no refusal will create
any civil liability on the part of the religious official or the corporate body.37
Two states that have recognized same-sex marriage, Iowa and Massachusetts,
however, do not have these statutory exemptions.38 Could one of these states—
or future states that adopt comparable regimes—require its religious officials
not to discriminate against same-sex couples in the administration of their
licenses to solemnize civil marriage?
The rest of Part II will confront the situation in which a state that
recognizes same-sex marriage has passed legislation requiring all those given
the legal authority to solemnize civil marriage to solemnize the marriages of all
couples who seek their services, straight or gay, who otherwise are eligible to
marry. Failure to administer the license in this way, the legislation says, will
result in a forfeiture of the license so extended. In other words, religious
officials may no longer discriminate against same-sex couples in their
solemnization of civil marriage. Perhaps unexpectedly, such legislation would
not violate the First Amendment free exercise rights of the religious official
who would choose not to solemnize same-sex marriages due to his or her faith.

35 See Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships, Religious Exemptions, and the
Production of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1190 nn.66–67 (2012) (surveying
the twenty-one states’ and the District of Columbia’s sexual orientation antidiscrimination laws).
36 See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Same-Sex Family Equality and Religious Freedom, 5 NW. J.L. &
SOC. POL’Y 274, 283–84 nn.44–48 (2010) (summarizing state laws protecting the conscience of religious
officials in light of same-sex marriage); see also Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation:
Contraception, Abortion, Same-Sex Marriage, and Other Clashes Between Religion and the State, 53 B.C. L.
REV. 1417, 1509–11 (2012).
37 See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 11, 1-a (McKinney Supp. 2014); see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 400(a)
(West Supp. 2014).
38 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, § 38 (2012); see also IOWA CODE § 595.10 (2014).
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B. No Free Exercise Exemption for Licensed Religious Officials
Current free exercise laws are controlled by the 1990 Supreme Court case
Employment Division v. Smith.39 In that case, the Court held that neutral laws
of general applicability are constitutionally permissible under the First
Amendment Free Exercise Clause even if they burden a private party’s
religion.40 Thus, if a law that required all individuals licensed to solemnize
civil marriage to do so in a nondiscriminatory manner were found to be a
neutral law of general applicability, then a licensed religious official would
have no free exercise exemption.41 Conversely, if the law were found to be not
neutral or not generally applicable, it would be subject to strict scrutiny and
required to be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.42
Courts, however, have had difficulty articulating precisely what makes a
law neutral and of general applicability.43 For example, in Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, the Supreme Court found that though a
statute prohibiting animal sacrifice on its face appeared neutral, it was used to
single out only certain forms of religious animal sacrifice when applied.44 The
Court thus struck the ordinance down as unconstitutional.45 In contrast, in
Locke v. Davey, the Court determined that the State of Washington’s statutory
prohibition of the use of state scholarship funding for students seeking a
theology degree was not unconstitutional.46 Though Justice Scalia (the author
of the Smith opinion) dissented, arguing that this statute was unconstitutional
since it facially discriminated against religion,47 the majority reasoned that the
burden placed on religion was “far milder” than that in Lukumi because it
imposed neither a civil nor criminal sanction on the practice of religion.48 As a
result of these inconsistent rulings by the Supreme Court, lower courts have
had difficulty applying the Smith standard.49 Nevertheless, a statute prohibiting
discrimination against same-sex couples by those licensed to solemnize
39

494 U.S. 872 (1990).
See id. at 879.
41 See id.
42 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993).
43 See Erin N. East, Comment, I Object: The RLUIPA as a Model for Protecting the Conscience Rights of
Religious Objectors to Same-Sex Relationships, 59 EMORY L.J. 259, 280–83 (2009) (discussing the problems
faced by courts in applying the Smith standard).
44 See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 538–39.
45 See id. at 524.
46 See 540 U.S. 712, 715 (2004).
47 See id. at 726 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
48 See id. at 720 (majority opinion).
49 See East, supra note 43, at 282–83.
40
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marriages makes no facial reference to religion and, so long as it applies to all
actors covered, appears to be a neutral law of general applicability.
There is a question, however, as to whether the religious neutrality of a law
is determined only by its final words or also by the intent of the legislature or
the actions of governmental officials in implementing the law. The Supreme
Court has not addressed this issue, but in Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, a federal
district court enjoined the State of Washington’s “duty to fill” statute on behalf
of pharmacists who raised religious objections to filling prescriptions for
contraceptives.50 The court enjoined the statute based on evidence that
“strongly suggest[ed] that the overriding objective of the subject regulations
was . . . to eliminate moral and religious objections from the business of
dispensing medication.”51 Thus, the statute, despite its neutral wording, was
not a neutral law of general applicability and was subject to strict scrutiny,
which it did not pass.52
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision,
however, ruling that it was improper to look to the statute’s legislative history
and intent to establish whether the law was neutral and of general
applicability.53 Additionally, to the extent that the Washington State Board of
Pharmacy’s motivation for adopting the rule could have been discerned, the
Ninth Circuit wrote, “it indicates that the Board’s concern was to promote the
public welfare, not to burden religious belief.”54 Under a rule as such, almost
any carefully crafted and facially neutral legislation would pass muster under
the Smith test and be found neutral and of general applicability. This is
especially true if the authors of the legislation utter nothing as evidence to the
contrary.
This no-intent approach is similar to the one the Supreme Court endorsed
in Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings
College of the Law v. Martinez.55 In Martinez, a religious student group on a
public California law school campus challenged a policy requiring official
student groups to comply with the school’s nondiscrimination policy.56
Specifically, all recognized student groups on campus were required to accept
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

See 524 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2007), vacated, 586 F.3d. 1109 (9th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1259.
Id. at 1259–60, 1263.
See Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1133–34 (9th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1134.
130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
See id. at 2974.
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all comers—that is, not to discriminate on the basis of, among other things,
religion and sexual orientation.57 The Christian Legal Society was denied
official student group status because its by-laws required the exclusion of
students who did not sign and comply with a statement of faith that contained
prohibitions on “unrepentant homosexual conduct.”58 In denying the Christian
Legal Society’s claim that the law school had violated its First Amendment
right to free exercise, the Court did not look beyond the face of the statute in
question in deciding its constitutionality.59
In dissent, Justice Alito argued that use of the nondiscrimination policy was
intended to burden religious organizations like the Christian Legal Society.60
The law school, Alito wrote, “currently has more than 60 registered groups
and, in all its history, has denied registration to exactly one: the Christian Legal
Society.”61
It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court has previously
inquired into the intent of a statute when addressing First Amendment case
law. For example, in McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, a Kentucky
courtroom expanded its original Ten Commandments display to include other
nonreligious items throughout the course of its Establishment Clause
litigation.62 In striking down the display, the Court gave great weight to what it
discerned to be intent to disguise its original Establishment Clause violation.63
The Court also looked to the intent of Congress in passing the Religious
Lands Use and Institutionalized Persons Act in order to uphold the act from an
Establishment Clause challenge.64 Even more explicitly, in Board of Education
v. Mergens, the Court considered the phrase “noncurriculum related” in the
Equal Access Act of 1984 in light of its “broad legislative purpose” to “address
perceived widespread discrimination against religious speech in public
schools.”65
Despite these precedents, the law remains uncertain regarding whether an
intent-based inquiry could be used to strike down a law requiring religious
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. at 3001 (Alito, J., dissenting).
See id. at 3000.
Id.
See 545 U.S. 844, 850 (2005).
See id. at 863–66.
See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 714–17 (2005).
496 U.S. 226, 238–39 (1990) (internal quotation mark omitted).
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officials to not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation in solemnizing
civil marriages. Martinez was the most recent of these cases to be decided and
is very similar in nature to the hypothetical at issue here. Moreover, the intent
of a statute barring discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is likely to
be found to be just that: the protection of same-sex couples from
discrimination.
The Smith test therefore provides little protection for religious objectors
disobeying antidiscrimination laws designed to protect same-sex couples.66 For
example, in North Coast Women’s Care Medical Group, Inc. v. San Diego
County Superior Court, a lesbian woman seeking intrauterine insemination to
become pregnant filed suit under California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act against
two doctors who refused to administer the treatment to her on the basis of their
religious objection to her sexual orientation.67 The California Supreme Court
held that the Unruh Civil Rights Act, which protects same-sex couples from
discrimination, was a neutral law of general applicability.68 Thus, the doctors
could not violate this statute by claiming a First Amendment free exercise
exemption.69 If this case is any indication, any inquiry into the intent of a law
prohibiting discrimination against same-sex couples in the solemnization of
civil marriage is unlikely to change the analysis of these laws as neutral and of
general applicability.
However, should a court find that the law is not neutral or of general
applicability, a litigant must then demonstrate that the law cannot survive strict
scrutiny—that the law serves no compelling governmental interest or that it is
not narrowly tailored.70 The law could also be subject to strict scrutiny if it
were enacted in a state that had its own state version of the federal Religious
Freedom Restoration Act71 or a state constitutional provision that provides
greater protection for religious liberty than the federal Free Exercise Clause.72
Nevertheless, a state’s interest in protecting its citizens from discrimination is a
66

See East, supra note 43, at 286–87.
See 189 P.3d 959, 964 (Cal. 2008).
68 Id. at 966; accord Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 2013-NMSC-040, ¶ 68, 309 P.3d 53 (holding
that the New Mexico Human Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination against customers on the basis of
sexual orientation, is a neutral law of general applicability).
69 See N. Coast Women’s Care, 189 P.3d at 966–67.
70 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993).
71 See Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. Rev.
466 (2010); Shruti Chaganti, Note, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Provides a Defense in Suits by
Private Plaintiffs, 99 Va. L. Rev. 343 (2013).
72 See, e.g., W. COLE DURHAM & ROBERT SMITH, RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW § 2:63
(2012) (analyzing the states that retain a strict scrutiny requirement post-Smith).
67
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compelling governmental interest.73 Therefore, the argument would come to
rest on whether the law is narrowly tailored. The question then becomes
whether it is necessary to curtail the conscience rights of a small group of
religious individuals when there are many other licensed individuals, religious
and nonreligious, who would be willing to solemnize the marriages of samesex couples.
On this point, several commentators argue that to protect same-sex couples
while simultaneously accommodating religious objectors, the law should
evaluate the burdens imposed by such an objection.74 If the burden imposed
upon a same-sex couple by a religious objector is too great, they argue, then
the same-sex couple’s need would trump the religious official’s objection, thus
stripping him of his protection.75 This would likely occur in circumstances
where there is only one church within a large geographic area with no justice
of the peace to substitute. While these instances might be rare, they are more
likely to occur in less populous areas or, ironically, in communities with
smaller gay or lesbian populations.76 In more populous areas, where gay and
lesbian couples could likely readily find able and willing substitute officiates,
an analysis of the relative burdens would therefore likely protect the religious
objector.77
Additionally, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, the Supreme Court
struck down an ordinance forbidding certain religious animal sacrifices in part
because the ordinances “proscribe[d] more religious conduct than [was]
necessary to achieve their stated ends.”78 Thus, because same-sex couples
could always avail themselves of the self-help measure of seeking a
nonobjecting licensed official to solemnize their marriages,79 a marriage
73 See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983) (“[T]he Government has a
fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education . . . .”).
74 See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 8, at 198; see also ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON
GOOD: RECLAIMING THE SPACE BETWEEN PERSON AND STATE 150 (2010).
75 See Laycock, supra note 8, at 197–98.
76 See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage from the
Healthcare Context, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS, supra note 8,
at 77, 97–100. This analysis assumes (problematically) that the burden imposed on a morally objecting
religious official is not different in kind from the burden imposed on same-sex couples.
77 Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1330–33 (2007)
(discussing the “proportionality” element of the narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny).
78 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 538 (1993).
79 Cf. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 667 (2004) (finding the Child Online Protection Act to not be the
least restrictive means and thus unconstitutional because of the existence of private filtering software); United
States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 807 (2000) (striking down a similar law for similar
reasons); Tom W. Bell, Free Speech, Strict Scrutiny, and Self-Help: How Technology Upgrades Constitutional
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antidiscrimination law would likewise proscribe more religious conduct than
necessary to achieve its ends.80 For these reasons, should the law be found to
be nonneutral or nongenerally applicable, it would likely not survive strict
scrutiny.
Nevertheless, a law requiring all individuals to administer their marriage
licenses in a nondiscriminatory fashion would most likely be found neutral and
of general applicability. Therefore, a state, consistent with the Free Exercise
Clause as currently interpreted, could require its licensed religious officials to
administer their licenses in a nondiscriminatory fashion to other-sex and samesex parties.
This point is not without controversy. Many authors dismiss such a claim
outright.81 Distinguished law and religion scholars Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle
also argue that this conclusion is incorrect.82 While they acknowledge that a
government could, by “impos[ing] a condition on its grant of the authority to
solemnize marriages,” create such a law “in a constitutionally defensible
way,”83 Lupu and Tuttle go on to say that “[t]he idea that clergy are agents of
the state, authorized to solemnize civil marriage, and therefore subject to
considerable state control, is deeply inconsistent with a core aspect of religious
liberty.”84 Specifically, Lupu and Tuttle argue that cases such as McDaniel v.
Paty,85 Locke v. Davey, and Hosanna-Tabor86 stand for the proposition that
“full religious liberty cannot co-exist with state control over the clergy.”87
Jurisprudence, 87 MINN. L. REV. 743, 762 (2003) (discussing the impact of the availability of private self-help
measures on whether laws are narrowly tailored).
80 The goal of such a statute could not be to end all forms of private discrimination against same-sex
couples. See infra note 123 (discussing the state action doctrine). Thus, because a licensed religious official is
not a state actor (see Part III), the religious official’s conduct would either fall outside the scope of the statute’s
stated ends entirely or, at minimum, be proscribed more than necessary due to available self-help measures, as
discussed above. Cf. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict
Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2423 (1996) (“If the law doesn’t actually advance the interest, then not
having the law at all would be a less restrictive but equally effective alternative.”).
81 See, e.g., Eric Alan Isaacson, Are Same-Sex Marriages Really a Threat to Religious Liberty?, 8 STAN.
J. C.R. & C.L. 123, 152 (2012) (“A state cannot, consistent with the First Amendment, require . . . priests to
solemnize . . . marriages at odds with their own traditions.”); Bold, Jr., supra note 11, at 199; cf. Roger
Severino, Or for Poorer? How Same-Sex Marriage Threatens Religious Liberty, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
939, 977 (2007) (discussing the potential issues surrounding the licensing of religious officials to solemnize
civil marriage).
82 See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 36, at 283.
83 Id. at 282.
84 Id. at 284.
85 See infra Part III.
86 See infra Part IV.
87 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 36, at 284.

STEVENS GALLEYSPROOFS

996

4/3/2014 3:03 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:979

Moreover, they argue, “the First Amendment diffuses and separates powers,
remitting the question of who may be entitled to religious marriage entirely to
the judgment of clergy and the faith communities they represent.”88 “State
interference with these forms of selectivity,” they conclude, “cannot possibly
be consistent with the free exercise of religion.”89
Lupu and Tuttle may ultimately be correct. But their analysis neglects the
reality of Smith. As demonstrated above, the Free Exercise Clause, as
interpreted in Smith, allows a state to burden the religious liberty of its citizens
with neutral laws of general applicability.90 Lupu and Tuttle appear instead to
be arguing for an exception to Smith based on more corporate free exercise and
associational rights, found outside the Free Exercise Clause.91 These larger,
corporate free exercise rights will thus play a crucial role in the solution
section of this Comment and are addressed in Part IV.
Because a law requiring all individuals to administer their licenses to marry
in a nondiscriminatory fashion would likely be found to be neutral and of
general applicability, the Free Exercise Clause provides no exemption for
religious objectors to the law. As a result, protections for religious objectors
must come from outside the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause. These
protections include not only state and federal statutory exemptions, but
judicially crafted exemptions, such as the ministerial exception92 and the
expressive association doctrine.93 These protections are explored in Part IV of
this Comment.94
But perhaps the more complex and troublesome First Amendment issue
relating to licensing religious officials is whether these regimes have created an
impermissible establishment of religion. How can we abide religious officials
being able to withhold legal rights from other citizens? Is this not the law
operating according to a certain faith? To answer these questions, this
Comment addresses in Part III this Establishment Clause question before
88 Id. at 285 (citing Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental
Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1998)).
89 Id.
90 See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
91 The authors point to another means of protecting the free exercise rights of licensed religious officials,
namely the expressive association doctrine, which is discussed in Part IV. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 36, at
285–86.
92 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 714–15 (2012).
93 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000).
94 The issue of whether a targeted statutory exemption for religion constitutes an establishment of
religion will also be addressed in Part IV.
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turning to solutions to both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clause issues
in Part IV.
III. AN IMPERMISSIBLE ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION
As intimated above, there appears to be a First Amendment Establishment
Clause problem in allowing marital status and attendant rights to be meted out
by religious officials according to their personal religious beliefs. Why are
religious officials able to wield this civil power and withhold it from some
citizens according to their private faiths? Before diving into whether this
practice violates the Establishment Clause, it will be useful to begin with a
brief survey of what the Establishment Clause prohibits and how its
interpretation has changed over time. After this brief survey, Part III addresses
two theories of how the practice of licensing religious officials to solemnize
civil marriage may be considered an establishment of religion—one based on
the state action doctrine and another on an impermissible delegation of
governmental authority. Part III concludes with a discussion of perhaps the
strongest argument against religious solemnization of civil marriage as an
establishment of religion—that of the historical practice exemption to a
violation of the Establishment Clause.
A. The Establishment Clause: A Brief Survey
Throughout its history of interpreting the Establishment Clause, the
Supreme Court has developed several unique and contrasting approaches.95
First, there is the “separationist” approach. This approach emphasizes the need
to protect government and religious affairs from unduly influencing or relying
on one another for support, adherence, or financial stability.96 First appearing
in the 1947 decision, Everson v. Board of Education,97 which incorporated the
Establishment Clause into the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause,98
this separationist line of cases has been used most ardently in cases forbidding
the use of religious officials, ceremonies, and symbols in public schools,99 and
those preventing taxpayer support of religious organizations.100
95 See JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
EXPERIMENT 173 (3d ed. 2011).
96 See id. at 174.
97 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
98 See WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 95, at 175.
99 See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963).
100 See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 667 (1970).
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In contrast, an “accommodationist” approach emerged before Everson in a
1952 case upholding the constitutionality of time-release programs for
religious students of public schools to attend religious services.101 “[W]e find
no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for government to be
hostile to religion,” Justice Douglas wrote.102 Accommodation logic thus
argues for equal treatment of religion as opposed to complete ostracism from
government affairs.103 Most prominently until the 1970s, this
accommodationist line of cases allowed for numerous avenues of government
support for private religious schools.104
However, beginning in the 1960s, the Supreme Court sought to find a new
middle-ground analysis in the form of a “neutrality” approach to the
Establishment Clause.105 A three-prong test thus emerged in 1971 in the case
of Lemon v. Kurtzman to strike down a state policy of reimbursing religious
schools for some of the costs of teaching required secular courses.106 For a
challenged law to be constitutional under this new Lemon test, the law must (1)
have a secular purpose, (2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religion, and (3) not “foster an excessive . . . entanglement” between
church and state.107 Yet the Lemon test remains inconsistently applied, if at
all.108
In the wake of this inconsistency, numerous other approaches to the
Establishment Clause have emerged. Tests such as “endorsement,” “coercion,”
“equal treatment,” or “strict neutrality” have each been favored by a particular
Justice or Court at one time or another.109 Similarly, the Court has at times
used a wild card “history” or “tradition” approach to Establishment Clause
cases.110 This wild card historical test, as mentioned above, is evaluated below
in section D.
Clearly, these Establishment Clause cases are often in tension with one
another. And though the Establishment Clause prohibits such practices as

101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110

See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952).
Id. at 314.
See WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 95, at 177.
See, e.g., Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 766–67 (1976).
See WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 95, at 177.
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971).
Id. at 612–13 (internal quotation mark omitted).
See WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 95, at 180.
See id. at 180–86.
See id. at 185–86.
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mandatory morning Bible readings in public school,111 prayers offered at
middle school graduations112 or at football games,113 public displays of
religious symbols in county courthouses,114 and education policies that
overwhelmingly benefit private religious schools,115 it is not immediately clear
how the Establishment Clause ought to apply to the religious official licensed
to solemnize civil marriage.
For example, in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, the Supreme Court held that the
Establishment Clause did not forbid a legislature from allowing religious
groups the right to only hire members of their own faith, for religious or
secular jobs.116 In Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC, the Court upheld the right of a
religious education licensee to engage in religious discrimination.117 Thus,
when a religious organization is operating within its own affairs, it can
sometimes discriminate on at least religious grounds. However, as cases like
Hosanna-Tabor and Martinez make clear, what looks like discrimination on
religious grounds to a religious organization may look like disability or sexual
orientation discrimination to others.118
In contrast to cases featuring religious groups operating within their own
affairs, religious groups are not permitted to discriminate on religious grounds
when they are operating with state funding or performing governmental
functions.119 Thus, faith-based initiatives that receive government money may
not discriminate on religious grounds against recipients of that money.120
Likewise, a state may not delegate its governmental functions to be carried out
by a religious organization.121 For example, in Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, the
Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a state law that allowed

111

See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963).
See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992).
113 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 317 (2000).
114 See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater
Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 621 (1989).
115 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971).
116 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S.
327, 339 (1987).
117 See infra Part IV.
118 See supra notes 55, 92.
119 See Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 127 (1982); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 298–
99 (1899).
120 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 798 (2000) (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234
(1997)) (inquiring as to whether a program “defines its recipients by reference to religion”).
121 See Larkin, 459 U.S. at 127.
112
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churches to veto applications for liquor licenses.122 Other laws concerning the
inspection of food and the police protection of private universities have also
been struck down under this rule.123
Deciding whether the practice of religious officials solemnizing civil
marriage is an impermissible establishment of religion thus requires one to
answer questions concerning the extent to which a licensed religious official is
a private or state actor, and whether states have improperly delegated their
governmental functions to private religious officials. These questions are
addressed in the sections below.
Section B argues that because licensed religious officials are not state
actors, they do not violate the Establishment Clause when they discriminate in
the solemnization of civil marriages on the basis of religion. Section B also
argues that the extension of a license to solemnize civil marriage by the state
does not constitute such a substantial benefit to religious officials so as to
justify the prohibition of religious discrimination in its administration.
However, section C argues that states have violated the Establishment Clause
by impermissibly delegating their governmental functions to private religious
officials so as to create an impermissible “fusion” of governmental and
religious functions. Section D then argues that this Establishment Clause
violation is unlikely to fall within the historical or cultural practice exemption
to the Establishment Clause introduced above.
B. A Licensed Religious Official Is Not a State Actor
A licensed religious official would be bound by the Constitution and the
Establishment Clause only if that official were also a state actor.124 Although
the state action doctrine is at times unclear and incoherent,125 the religious

122

See id.
See Commack Self-Serv. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss, 294 F.3d 415, 432 (2d Cir. 2002) (striking
down a portion of New York’s kosher fraud laws); State v. Pendleton, 451 S.E.2d 274, 278 (N.C. 1994)
(finding that “the State of North Carolina delegated its police power to [a private religious institution]” in
violation of the Establishment Clause).
124 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (“Since the decision of this Court in the Civil Rights
Cases, the principle has become firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the action inhibited by the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States. That
Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.” (citation
omitted)).
125 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 503–04 (1985).
123

STEVENS GALLEYSPROOFS

2014]

4/3/2014 3:03 PM

BY THE POWER VESTED IN ME?

1001

official licensed to solemnize civil marriage is certainly not a state actor.126 As
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis makes clear, the mere licensure of an individual
or an organization does not make that private individual or organization a state
actor.127 Thus, it is no violation of the Establishment Clause for such a licensed
religious official to discriminate in the administration of his or her license
according to the dictates of his or her faith.
This stands in some tension with cases that inquire into the existence of
religious discrimination practiced by faith-based nonprofits that receive
government funding or other benefits,128 and also with cases that examine
whether a private actor performs a function that is “traditionally the exclusive
prerogative of the State.”129 Nevertheless, these tensions can be reconciled.
To begin, as discussed above, marriage is not an exclusive prerogative of
the state.130 Because marriage is not the exclusive prerogative of the state, the
licensed religious official is not converted into a state actor.
Yet an argument could be made that because religious officials who
solemnize civil marriage receive customary payments from the couples that
receive their services, these payments are a form of government funding, and
therefore religious officials should not be permitted to discriminate on
religious grounds in the exercise of their governmentally funded activity. Such
customary payments to the religious officiate, however, are virtually identical
to the system of private vouchers redeemed at religious schools upheld in
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.131 In Zelman, a group of Ohio taxpayers brought
an Establishment Clause challenge against an Ohio program of tuition
assistance that led to 96% of those receiving the assistance enrolling in
religious schools.132 Despite this statistic, the Supreme Court upheld the
program, finding that it was a neutral program of “true private choice.”133 The
126 See Marc D. Stern, Same-Sex Marriage and the Churches, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS, supra note 8, at 1, 20.
127 See 407 U.S. 163, 176–77 (1972) (holding that a private club did not become a state actor as a result of
its license to serve alcohol).
128 See Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 757–58 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741
(1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 683 (1971).
129 See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982) (italics removed) (quoting Jackson v. Metro.
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S.
991, 1011 (1982)).
130 See Bold, supra note 11, at 185.
131 See 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002).
132 Id. at 658.
133 Id. at 662.
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Court thus affirmed a line of cases that found such neutral programs of private
choice immune from an Establishment Clause challenge.134
Virtually the same system is at play here, where the licensed religious
official is compensated for his or her services as wedding officiate. Because
such state licensing statutes are neutral with regard to religion,135 any payments
to a solemnizing religious officiate is the result of true private choice.
Consequently, such customary payments to the licensed religious official do
not constitute government funding, nor do they change the Establishment
Clause analysis.
Furthermore, religious discrimination by a religious entity only becomes
problematic when a certain threshold benefit is extended. The licensing of
religious officials to solemnize civil marriage does not cross this benefit
threshold. This can be seen best by juxtaposing various decisions forbidding or
allowing religious discrimination by religious entities depending on the
individual context. For instance, government aid to religious social services or
schools clearly triggers an inquiry into the existence of religious discrimination
on the part of the religious recipient.136 Likewise, a religious group seeking
recognition and access to school resources on a public law-school campus was
not permitted to discriminate on religious grounds.137 Yet, as noted above in
Presiding Bishop v. Amos138 and Hosanna-Tabor,139 schools and churches have
been permitted to engage in religious discrimination despite the benefits of
incorporation and teaching licenses extended by the state.140
Thus, the benefit of a license to solemnize civil marriage does not cross this
“benefit threshold” because such a license is more akin to the legal ability to
incorporate or teach than it is to the benefit of government tax dollars or
private university resources. For example, the legal recognition given to a
religiously solemnized marriage ceremony is like the legal recognition given to
the preexisting constitutional rights of religious entities to organize,
134

Id. at 662–63.
See supra Part I.
136 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 797–98 (2000) (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,
234 (1997)) (inquiring as to whether a program “defines its recipients by reference to religion”).
137 See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 130 S.
Ct. 2971, 2994–95 (2010).
138 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S.
327, 330 (1987).
139 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706–09 (2012).
140 See, e.g., DURHAM & SMITH, supra note 72, § 4:1 (detailing the need for religious organizations to
incorporate).
135
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incorporate, and educate their children.141 The issue is not whether religious
groups have a constitutional right to give legal effect to their marriage
ceremonies, but that the legal recognition of those ceremonies does not further
augment the abilities of those communities to have private wedding
ceremonies, which they are already capable of doing under the First
Amendment.142 Government aid or school resources, in contrast, enable
religious organizations to operate in ways that they otherwise would not be
able. Furthermore, unlike government aid, which raises the possibility of
coerced support of religious practices,143 a religious official licensed to
solemnize civil marriage coerces no one in solemnizing the marriages of only
those couples that choose that official. Therefore, because the religious official
and community gain no benefit other than mere legal recognition, a license to
solemnize civil marriage does not constitute such a substantial benefit so as to
warrant a prohibition on its religiously discriminatory application.
C. An Impermissible Delegation of Governmental Authority
Even if a licensed religious official is not a state actor, or a license does not
constitute such a substantial benefit so as to justify a prohibition on religious
discrimination, another wholly distinct Establishment Clause issue may be
asserted against the licensed religious official; this theory may be called the
“Impermissible Delegation Doctrine.” Specifically, as mentioned above, the
Establishment Clause has been read to forbid certain delegations of civil
authority and discretion to religious institutions.144
For example, in Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, a Massachusetts law allowing
churches to veto applications for a liquor license within five hundred feet of
church property was found to be an impermissible establishment of religion.145
141

See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (recognizing the rights of parents to send
their children to religious private schools).
142 See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694, 707 (2012) (recognizing the limits of government
interference with internal church doctrine and practices).
143 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (“No tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions . . . .”).
144 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 609 (1992) (Blackmun, Stevens & O’Connor, JJ., concurring)
(“We have believed that . . . a government cannot endure when there is fusion between religion and the
political regime.”); see also Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 709–10
(1994) (striking down a school district created along religious lines); Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S.
116, 127 (1982); Commack Self-Serv. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss, 294 F.3d 415, 432 (2d Cir. 2002) (striking
down a portion of New York’s kosher fraud laws); State v. Pendleton, 451 S.E.2d 274, 278 (N.C. 1994); State
ex rel. Heitkamp v. Family Life Servs., Inc., 2000 ND 166, ¶ 36, 616 N.W.2d 826, 839.
145 See Larkin, 459 U.S. at 127.

STEVENS GALLEYSPROOFS

1004

4/3/2014 3:03 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:979

In striking down the law, the Supreme Court found that the law “enmeshe[d]
churches in the exercise of substantial governmental powers contrary to . . . the
Establishment Clause.”146 Additionally, the Court was concerned that the
statute could provide “a significant symbolic benefit to religion in the minds of
some by reason of the power conferred.”147 Moreover, “the core rationale
underlying the Establishment Clause,” the Court wrote, “is preventing ‘a
fusion of governmental and religious functions.’”148 According to the Court,
the Framers thus did not intend a “government in which important,
discretionary governmental powers would be delegated to or shared with
religious institutions.”149
Is the authority to marry similar to the authority to veto applications for a
liquor license? Arguably, the burdens imposed by a denial of marital status,
with its denial of marital benefits and stigma of discrimination, is more of a
burden than the business lost from a denied liquor license. But perhaps these
cases are distinguishable: churches in Larkin held absolute veto power;150 in
contrast, objecting religious officials are the exception to the rule—they hold
no veto power. Also, Larkin entailed the delegation of pure governmental
power151: the discretion to make zoning decisions. Marriage, on the other hand,
is not a pure and unequivocal government power. Is this distinction enough to
avoid the dictum in Larkin?
As noted above, other cases have used this “fusion” rationale to strike
down laws concerning the regulation of fraudulent Kosher food,152 the creation
of a school district along religious lines,153 a court order allowing a corporation
and its ministerial association to select a new board of directors,154 and a
religious university’s use of state police power.155 Perhaps most notably,
however, this prohibition on fusions of governmental and religious functions

146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155

Id. at 126.
Id. at 125–26.
Id. at 126–27 (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)).
Id. at 127.
Id. (stating that the law at issue gave the church “unilateral and absolute power”).
Id. at 122 (“This is a power ordinarily vested in agencies of government.”).
See Commack Self-Serv. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss, 294 F.3d 415, 432 (2d Cir. 2002).
See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696–97 (1994).
See State ex rel. Heitkamp v. Family Life Servs., Inc., 2000 ND 166, 616 N.W.2d 826.
See State v. Pendleton, 451 S.E.2d 274 (N.C. 1994).
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was used in Lee v. Weisman to help strike down a public school’s practice of
offering nonsectarian prayers at graduation ceremonies.156
Larkin and its progeny thus invite an examination of when and where a
“fusion of governmental and religious functions” occurs. To be sure, marriage
entails both governmental and religious functions. For example, on the one
hand, the Massachusetts and Iowa Supreme Courts describe their decisions
recognizing same-sex marriage as relating only to “civil marriage”—marriage
created and maintained by the state.157 On the other hand, those faiths apt to
object to solemnizing same-sex marriages believe marriage is a covenant
before God and man, or a sacrament symbolizing God’s relationship with
man.158
Are these two functions “fused” when a religious official solemnizes the
marriage of two individuals in his or her congregation? Arguably yes—that is,
if the religious official purports to be enacting civil and religious authority with
the same breath at the pronouncement of marriage. This seems to be what
religious officials in fact do when they proclaim, at the culmination of their
religious ceremony, “By the power vested in me by the state of X, I now
pronounce you husband and wife.” And what is a fusion of governmental and
religious functions if not a single proclamation by one individual that
accomplishes both civil and spiritual marriage?
As this analysis makes clear, even though marriage is not an unequivocal
sole governmental power, like the authority to make zoning decisions, what
authority the state does have over marriage is fused with the authority of a
religious community in the same ceremony. This fusion thus violates the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
This, however, does not end the establishment inquiry. As mentioned
previously, in a long line of establishment cases, the Supreme Court has held
that certain longstanding and culturally significant religious displays in public
do not violate the Establishment Clause. In the next section, however, this

156 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 609 (1992) (Blackmun, Stevens & O’Connor, JJ., concurring)
(“We have believed that . . . a government cannot endure when there is fusion between religion and the
political regime.”).
157 See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003) (“We begin by considering
the nature of civil marriage itself. Simply put, the government creates civil marriage.”); see also Varnum v.
Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906 (Iowa 2009) (stating that “civil marriage will now take on a new meaning”).
158 See, e.g., John Witte, Jr. & Joel A. Nichols, More Than a Mere Contract: Marriage as a Contract and
Covenant in Law and Theology, 5 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 595, 606–11 (2008).
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Comment argues that this historical practice exception cannot be relied on to
pardon this otherwise impermissible fusion of governmental and religious
functions.
D. The Historical Practice Inquiry
The Supreme Court has held that certain cultural and historical practices of
state and federal government entities that appear to contain religious elements
do not violate the Establishment Clause.159 For example, in Lynch v. Donnelly,
the Supreme Court upheld a Rhode Island government display of a manger
scene while observing that “[t]here is an unbroken history of official
acknowledgment by all three branches of government of the role of religion in
American life.”160 The Court found that the manger scene took on a secular
civic purpose having become a part of the fabric of society.161 Similarly, in
upholding a state practice of funding a chaplain to open its legislative sessions
in prayer, the Court wrote, “In light of the unambiguous and unbroken history
of more than 200 years, there can be no doubt that the practice of opening
legislative sessions with prayer has become part of the fabric of our society.”162
Moreover, in upholding a public display of the Decalogue, the Court wrote that
the Decalogue had become part of “America’s heritage.”163 These precedents
therefore provide a possible Establishment Clause escape route for the
otherwise impermissible fusion of governmental and religious functions
discussed above.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in this area has charted a jagged and
uncertain course in deciding what government displays of religion are
permissible.164 Contributing to this uncertainty is the fact-intensive and
context-specific nature of the inquiry.165 That being said, several rules of
thumb can be gleaned from Court precedent to help determine whether the
solemnization of marriages by religious officials is an establishment of
religion.166

159

See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
Id. at 674.
161 See id. at 680–86.
162 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983).
163 See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 689 (2005) (plurality opinion).
164 See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 621 (1989) (holding
that a similar manger scene was a violation of the Establishment Clause).
165 See id. at 621 n.70.
166 These four rules of thumb are borrowed from WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 95, at 234–36.
160
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First, older displays and practices are more likely to be permissible displays
of religion than newer displays and practices.167 This principle when applied to
the solemnization of marriages by religious officials seems to overwhelmingly
weigh against a finding of an establishment of religion. As discussed in Part I,
religious officials have been solemnizing marriages since the colonial period.
The first colony began licensing clergy to solemnize weddings in 1694.168
Moreover, the ubiquitous role of religious officials in marriage ceremonies
today seems to fit perfectly within the scope of those practices that have
become part of the civic fabric of society.169
But perhaps this timeframe that encompasses the colonial period proves too
much. Norms, societal attitudes, and the law itself have changed drastically in
recent times on the subject of marriage.170 How then can what was
commonplace in colonial times continue to justify the status quo concerning
marriage today? Nevertheless, the longstanding historical practice of religious
solemnization of civil marriage may be the strongest argument against a
finding of an establishment of religion.
Second, the characterization of the establishment symbol or practice in
question is crucial.171 This inquiry clearly weighs in favor of a finding of
establishment. The question here is how one characterizes the traditional
wedding ceremony solemnized by a religious official. Given the presence of
the religious official, the (typical) church venue, the recitation of prayers, and
the exchanging of vows, there seems no other conclusion than that it is a
religious ceremony. A court could strain, if it wished, to find elements that
favor the secular character of a typical wedding ceremony, but that would
likely prove unconvincing since the ceremony’s secular nature is certainly
matched by its spiritual nature.

167 See id. at 235 (“Older religious displays and practices were at issue in McGowan, Marsh, Lynch, Van
Orden, Pleasant Grove, and Buono, and the government won each time. Newer displays were at issue in Stone,
Allegheny, and McCreary, and the government lost each time.”).
168 See GROSSBERG, supra note 22, at 76.
169 See supra notes 137–39 and accompanying text.
170 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (finding that a Virginia ban on interracial marriages
violated the Fourteenth Amendment); cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 563 (2003) (finding that a Texas
criminal statute prohibiting “deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex” violated the
Fourteenth Amendment).
171 See WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 95, at 235 (“Stone and McCreary characterized the Decalogue as a
religious symbol and struck it down; Van Orden and Pleasant Grove characterized it as an historical marker
and let it stand.”).
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Third, government displays of religion that take place on private property
fare better than displays of religion on government property.172 Because a
wedding ceremony typically takes place on private property, one might think
that the third factor weighs against a finding of establishment. Here,
paradoxically, the fact that this government delegation of authority takes place
overwhelmingly within the walls of churches would favor a finding of
establishment. The reason for the reversal is evident when considering the
nature of the symbol or practice in relation to its proper location: religious
symbols most naturally belong on private property, whereas government
authority most naturally should be exercised from within government agencies.
Finally, the fourth factor is “whether the religious symbol or practice is
offset by secular symbols or practices.”173 Here, there do not appear to be
many secular symbols or practices to offset the religious nature of the
ceremony. The fourth factor therefore likely weighs in favor of a finding of an
establishment of religion or is a neutral factor at best.
Altogether, the uncertainty of this line of cases174 and these four rules of
thumb make clear that the “government display of religion” line of cases
provides no safe haven for the practice of religious solemnization of civil
marriage. The longstanding historical and cultural nature of the religious
official’s role in marriage ceremonies makes for a compelling argument that it
should not now be found to be an establishment of religion. Yet there is also
the definite possibility a court could understand the radical new changes in
marriage laws and norms to require a new understanding of the traditional role
of religion in marriage.
Thus, despite the possibility of a historical exception, governmental and
religious functions are indeed fused, in violation of the Establishment Clause,
at the solemnization of a civil marriage by a licensed religious official. This
therefore constitutes an impermissible delegation of government authority to
religion.
This, however, does not mean that the nuptial world as we know it is
ending; as Part IV demonstrates, narrow time, place, and manner regulations
172

See id. at 236 (“Government-sponsored displays on private property, as in Lynch, get more deference
than private displays on government property, as in Stone and Allegheny.”).
173 Id.
174 See id. at 237 (“Even a sympathetic reader of the Court’s modern establishment law is tempted to
apply to it the definition that Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. once applied to the common law: ‘chaos with an
index.’”).
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are all that are required to cure this impermissible establishment of religion.
These measures will not require religious officials to be stripped of their
licenses nor require officials to abandon their historical role in the
solemnization of civil marriages. In turning to solutions to these constitutional
problems, however, Part IV begins by first setting forth solutions to the free
exercise problem discussed previously. Part IV then details the time, place, and
manner regulations needed to remedy the Establishment Clause violation just
described.
IV. TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF A ROBUST RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
A. The Free Exercise Problem
As discussed in Part II, a state may, consistent with the Free Exercise
Clause, require its religious officials licensed to solemnize civil marriage to
administer their licenses in a way that violates the dictates of their faiths.175
Though this may be yet another unintended consequence of Smith, barring its
death, any protection for religious officials must come from within its
framework. These protections can therefore take two forms. First, Congress or
the states can pass statutory exemptions explicitly protecting religious
officials’ right to refuse to marry same-sex couples. Second, should Congress
or state legislatures fail to pass statutory protections, religious communities
will be able to avail themselves of judicially crafted remedies.
1. Statutory Remedies
The most apt remedy to this problem is the one already enacted in almost
every state that has recognized same-sex marriage: a state statutory exemption
protecting the right of religious officials to refuse to solemnize marriages
against their conscience. But such legislative exemptions are not without
controversy and are often subject to heated debate.176 As noted above, these
exemptions are conspicuously absent in a few states.177 Moreover, if a state
were to pass marriage solemnization antidiscrimination laws, it may not be
inclined to pass such statutory protections. And while most states have already
passed such conscience-protection statutes, the variances in coverage could
175

See supra Part II.
See Frank Gulino, A Match Made in Albany: The Uneasy Wedding of Marriage Equality and Religious
Liberty, N.Y. ST. B.J., Jan. 2012, at 38 (outlining the compromise and debate over New York’s conscience
exemption to its same-sex marriage laws).
177 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, § 38 (2012); see also IOWA CODE § 595.10 (2014).
176
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potentially lead to divergent interpretations by state courts.178 Therefore, the
most expedient and comprehensive remedy available for religious communities
is a federal conscience exemption.179
Federal legislation aimed at protecting the right of religious officials to
refuse to marry same-sex couples should therefore include the following: (1) a
conscience clause protecting a religious official’s refusal according to his faith
to solemnize same-sex marriages, (2) a clause disallowing any civil or criminal
liability for such a refusal, and (3) a clause protecting the tax-exempt status of
these refusing religious communities. These exemptions would prove
comprehensive in protecting religious officials and their communities of faith.
Additionally, these statutory exemptions raise no Establishment Clause
concerns. In a long line of cases, most recently again affirmed in Cutter v.
Wilkinson, the Supreme Court has recognized that targeted exemptions for the
free exercise of religious adherents do not fall within the prohibition of the
Establishment Clause.180 These protections would therefore be immune from
an assault on their constitutionality.
2. Judicial Remedies
If Congress or state legislatures are unable or unwilling to pass statutory
conscience protections for religious officials, religious litigants will be able to
avail themselves of two judicially crafted exemptions, one of which comes
from outside the Free Exercise Clause. The first is the expanded ministerial
exception as laid down in Hosanna-Tabor.181 The second is the expressive
association doctrine recognized in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.182
a. An Expanded Ministerial Exception
The ministerial exception had long been recognized by U.S. courts of
appeals as an exception for religious institutions’ employment relationships
with their ministers183 before being adopted by the Supreme Court in Hosanna-

178

See Wilson, supra note 36, at 1509–11 (comparing statutory exemptions for clergy in several states).
Whether such a federal conscience exemption would violate the Tenth Amendment’s federalism
protections is beyond the scope of this Comment.
180 See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 724 (2005).
181 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
182 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000).
183 See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 705 & n.2.
179
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Tabor.184 In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court held that the ministerial exception
applied to a church that had fired one of its “called teachers” when that teacher
had filed a claim under the ADA against the church.185 Thus, what would have
otherwise been retaliation was protected conduct under the ministerial
exception.186
Interestingly, the Court did not contest the fact that the ADA’s prohibition
on retaliation was a neutral law of general applicability.187 Yet the Court
distinguished Smith from this case by pointing out that Smith involved
regulation of “only outward physical acts” of the religious.188 “The present
case, in contrast,” the Court wrote, “concerns government interference with an
internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself.
The contention that Smith forecloses recognition of a ministerial exception
rooted in the Religion Clauses has no merit.”189
The Hosanna-Tabor decision is paradoxically both frighteningly openended and narrow. The holding by its very words is limited to the decision by a
church to fire a minister who had brought an employment discrimination suit
against the church.190 But the Court in the next sentence states that it
“express[es] no view on whether the exception bars other types of suits,
including actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct
by their religious employers. There will be time enough to address the
applicability of the exception to other circumstances if and when they arise.”191
Therefore, it appears as though the ministerial exception could be
broadened to cover a religious official who objected to a law that would
require the official to violate his or her conscience in solemnizing a same-sex
marriage. To do so, the ministerial exception would first have to be broadened
to cover not just the ability of a church to control who its ministers are. But
certainly, whose marriages a minister solemnizes, with the spiritual authority
and duty that a minister carries, is “an internal church decision that affects the
faith and mission of the church itself.”192 And if “[t]he church must be free to

184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192

See id. at 706.
Id. at 706–07.
Id. at 706–09.
Id. at 707.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 710.
Id.
Id. at 707.
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choose those who will guide it on its way,”193 then the church should also be
free to choose upon whose marriages it will extend its spiritual blessing. Thus,
there is some chance that the ministerial exception could be expanded to cover
decisions by churches concerning whose marriages a minister may, as the
church’s representative and faith leader, solemnize or bless.
This expansion of the ministerial exception would not be unprecedented.
The Court itself in the Hosanna-Tabor decision, before adopting the
ministerial exception, detailed prior precedents relating to government
interference with internal church decisions to support the ministerial
exception’s grounding within the First Amendment.194 The Court cited Watson
v. Jones,195 in which the Court “declined to question” the determination of the
General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church that the antislavery faction of
one of its churches controlled the property of that church’s location.196 The
Court in that case wrote that “whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith,
or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of [the]
church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals
must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them.”197
Cited next is Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox
Church, in which the Court held that a New York law that required the Russian
Orthodox Church in New York to recognize a decision of its North American
governing body violated the Free Exercise Clause.198 In the third and final case
cited, the Court held that the First Amendment “permit[s] hierarchical religious
organizations to establish their own rules and regulations for internal discipline
and government, and to create tribunals for adjudicating disputes over these
matters.”199 “When ecclesiastical tribunals decide such disputes,” the
Hosanna-Tabor Court observed, “‘the Constitution requires that civil courts
accept their decisions as binding upon them.’”200
These cases provide a larger context for the ministerial exception and
demonstrate that the Court recognizes that the Free Exercise Clause protects

193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200

Id. at 710.
Id. at 704–05.
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 704.
See Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727.
See 344 U.S. 94, 120–21 (1952).
Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724 (1976).
See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 705 (quoting Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 725).
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the ability of religious institutions to make their own decisions regarding
internal issues of faith.
Therefore, because the decision by a religious community to solemnize a
marriage is an intimate, internal issue of faith and theology, the ministerial
exception should be broadened to protect licensed religious officials and their
communities. Marriage is a profoundly spiritual institution for many religious
communities and their adherents. It is not entered into lightly; and for some, it
is not exited easily either. If a faith is afforded the right to determine its
questions of leadership and theology, it should also be afforded the right to
withhold its sacrament or covenant of marriage from those whom it believes to
be theologically unfit for the union. To cast the same in terms more natural to
the ministerial exception, a religious community should not only be able to
control who its ministers are, but to whom those ministers administer the
privileges of their faith as well.
b. The Expressive Association Doctrine
In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the Supreme Court held that the First
Amendment prevented the Boy Scouts from being forced to admit a gay scout
leader into its leadership, as would be required under antidiscrimination
laws.201 The Boy Scouts, the Court held, were protected by a right of
expressive association under the First Amendment.202 A church or faith
community should also be able to avail itself of this argument. Clearly, being
forced to solemnize or celebrate a marriage contrary to the tenets of a religious
official’s faith would burden the expression of that religious official’s faith as
well as the faith of that official’s larger religious community (since the
religious official, as noted above, is a representative and leader of that
community). Lupu and Tuttle put it this way: “[A] proposition crucial to
religious liberty is that religions, to maintain their integrity, must and do
discriminate.”203 As a result, the argument would run, religious communities
should be able to protect the integrity and public expression of their faiths by
availing themselves of the same expressive association protection extended in
Dale.

201
202
203

530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000).
Id.
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 35, at 285.
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But at issue in Dale was a private, voluntary association, merely
incorporated by the state as a nonprofit.204 These religious officials, on the
other hand, are recipients of state power—the license to marry. Does this put
religious officials outside the protection of the expressive association doctrine?
As noted in Part III, courts have held that faith-based organizations that
receive money from the federal government cannot administer their funds in
such a way as to discriminate on religious grounds or unduly proselytize.205
Likewise, commercial entities are likely not protected by a similar
associational freedom.206 But an objecting religious official, but for the
extended license, would simply be a private entity; he or she receives no
government money and does not operate as a commercial enterprise.
Moreover, the larger religious community, in contrast to the singular licensed
religious official as an individual, is virtually identical to the Boy Scouts in
Dale: a private, voluntary association incorporated as a nonprofit.207 Thus, the
religious community as a whole may be best able to assert the expressive
association doctrine to protect itself and its individual licensed religious
officials.
Regardless, because a law requiring religious officials to solemnize
marriages contrary to their faith would burden the expressive faith of (1) the
religious official and (2) the larger religious community of which that official
is a representative, courts should also extend the expressive association
doctrine to protect religious officials and communities from any such laws.
B. “Unfusing” the Establishment Problem
As demonstrated in Part III, when a religious official enacts both civil and
spiritual marriage in a single solemnization ceremony, he or she fuses
governmental and religious functions.208 This fusion thus constitutes an
impermissible establishment of religion. As discussed earlier, this is one reason
why some call for the strict separation of church and state in marriage.

204

Dale, 530 U.S. at 649.
See supra Part III; see also Thomas C. Berg, The Voluntary Principle and Church Autonomy, Then
and Now, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1593, 1605 (“Religious organizations . . . . may be pressured to become wholly
secular in order to receive aid on a level playing field.”).
206 See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 36, at 285 n.60 (citing a Minnesota case that did not grant a for-profit
Christian health club the right to discriminate on the basis of religion).
207 See Dale, 530 U.S. at 644.
208 See supra Part III.
205
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But what if these two functions could be teased out—that is, unfused?
Consider first whether the statute that licenses religious officials to marry
individuals fuses governmental and religious functions by its very nature. The
statute does not forbid a religious official to marry a couple in a purely
religious or spiritual sense. Nor does it forbid that religious official from
marrying a couple in only the legal or civic sense. Could a religious official
then not “marry” a couple twice? These separate ceremonies or solemnizations
would thus represent the separate functions of government and religion,
unfused, with respect to marriage. This separation would in effect unfuse the
impermissible delegation as forbidden in Larkin.
A statute licensing religious officials to solemnize civil marriage is
therefore akin to statutes that require the state certification of teachers to teach
in religious schools. Certifying teachers to teach in religious schools does not
ipso facto establish a religion.209 Moreover, the Supreme Court in McDaniel v.
Paty held that a Tennessee statute that disqualified ministers from holding
elected office was an unconstitutional violation of the minister’s free exercise
rights.210 The Court’s brief analysis is worth quoting in full:
Yet under the clergy-disqualification provision, McDaniel cannot
exercise both rights simultaneously because the State has conditioned
the exercise of one on the surrender of the other. Or, in James
Madison’s words, the State is “punishing a religious profession with
the privation of a civil right.” In so doing, Tennessee has encroached
upon McDaniel’s right to the free exercise of religion. “[T]o
condition the availability of benefits [including access to the ballot]
upon this appellant’s willingness to violate a cardinal principle of
[his] religious faith [by surrendering his religiously impelled
ministry] effectively penalizes the free exercise of [his] constitutional
211
liberties.”

In effect, in McDaniel the Court recognized that ministers can wear two hats at
the same time—those of both a citizen and a minister.
A statute licensing a religious official may thus be naturally read to allow
for a religious official to marry a couple both spiritually and legally, wearing

209

See, e.g., Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 815 F.2d 485, 500 (8th Cir. 1987) (upholding a teacher
certification requirement as applicable to religious schools); see also Sheridan Road Baptist Church v. Dep’t of
Educ., 396 N.W.2d 373 (Mich. 1986); State ex rel. Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church, 301 N.W.2d 571 (Neb.
1981).
210 See 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978).
211 Id. (citations omitted).
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the proverbial two hats yet again. Thus, the establishment problem created by
states licensing religious officials to solemnize civil marriage is created not by
the statute itself, but at the point of solemnization—that is, in the ceremony
itself.
Thus, what is needed is not strict separation but a clearer division in the
solemnization ceremony between a religious official acting in his or her
spiritual capacity and in his or her publicly licensed capacity. To accomplish
this, Congress or state legislatures should enact narrow time, place, and
manner regulations aimed at ensuring this clear division. These time, place,
and manner regulations should require that two separate ceremonies be held for
all marriages solemnized by a licensed religious official. A religious official
could first marry a couple spiritually,212 and then in a second civil ceremony,
held in a different location, marry the couple civilly. These regulations should
also prohibit language invoking state authority in the spiritual ceremony and
invocations of spiritual authority in the civil ceremony; for example, a
religious official should no longer purport to marry a couple spiritually by the
power vested in him or her by the state.
These regulations would not be unique in the world. In fact, these
regulations would be similar to what France and England require of their
marriage ceremonies. For example, France requires a ceremony celebrated by a
civil authority; a religious ceremony may or may not be held afterwards.213
Likewise, in England, there are restrictions on where weddings can take place
and, in a ceremony, on what words may be used.214
Enacting regulations such as these would thus accomplish the necessary
unfusing of governmental and religious functions to avoid an Establishment
Clause violation. The religious official acts first only in his spiritual and
private capacity. In this first ceremony, the religious official has carried out his
or her spiritual function. Only once this spiritual power is fully exercised and
finished altogether may the religious official then carry out his or her
governmental function of solemnizing the couple’s civil marriage as required
by law. There is a clear divide between the two functions, and no words are

212

See Deuteronomy 5:7 (King James) (“Thou shalt have none other gods before me.”).
See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 165 (Fr.).
214 See Marriage Act, 1949, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 76, § 44 (detailing the language to be used in the
solemnization ceremony); Marriage Act, 1994, c. 34, § 1 (amending Marriage Act 1949 to allow for the
approval of local premises for marriage solemnization).
213
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spoken by the licensed religious official to compromise that divide. The
Establishment Clause is thus satisfied.
Aside from potential political resistance, these regulations would likely
face two main legal challenges, both of which are ultimately unavailing. First,
it could be argued that these regulations unduly burden a religious
community’s free speech rights or (ironically) its free exercise rights. Second,
it could be argued that these regulations foster an “excessive entanglement”
between government and religion.
As to the first argument, the Supreme Court has held that valid time, place,
and manner restrictions that may burden an individual’s First Amendment
rights are not unconstitutional.215 As long as these restrictions were passed in
such a way as to apply generally and nondiscriminatorily (similar to Smith’s
neutral and of general applicability rule), then they are likely to be valid time,
place, and manner restrictions.216
Moreover, even if these procedural safeguards were not found to be valid
time, place, and manner regulations on public conduct, they would likely
survive strict scrutiny. Under a strict scrutiny analysis, there is a threshold
question of whether there is even a significant enough burden on free exercise
to justify a cause of action.217 Under these restrictions, the burdens of having
two separate ceremonies, in two separate locations, while only avoiding
improper invocations of authority, are likely de minimis.218
As to the second argument, these provisions do not lead to an
impermissible “excessive entanglement” of government and religion. Recall
that this excessive entanglement test comes from the third prong of the threeprong test articulated first in Lemon v. Kurtzman.219 Specifically, the test
requires that state policies do not foster “excessive entanglement between
government and religion.”220

215 See Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 402 (1953) (upholding the “uniform, nondiscriminatory,
and consistent administration of . . . licenses for public meetings”); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304
(1940) (“[A] State may by general and non-discriminatory legislation regulate the times, the places, and the
manner of soliciting upon its streets . . . .”).
216 See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304.
217 See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718–19, 725 (2004) (finding the exclusion of theology majors from
state scholarship funding as only a “relatively minor burden”).
218 See id. at 725.
219 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
220 Id. at 609 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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To begin, it is unclear how the excessive entanglement test would be
applied to these time, place, and manner regulations. Lemon and its progeny
originally were focused on state funding of religious education.221 Moreover,
Lemon’s separatist logic has been walked back considerably following the
Equal Treatment line of cases culminating in the Court’s upholding of a statefunded voucher program in which 96.6% of the voucher funding went to
religious schools.222 The Lemon test has, however, been applied to cases
outside the school funding context and primarily in the religious symbols
context.223
Yet the time, place, and manner regulations proposed in this Comment fall
into neither category. There is no government funding at stake, and no
symbolic featuring of religion in the public square. In fact, these regulations do
the very opposite; they are designed to cure the true excessive entanglement of
church and state—that is, their functional fusion in the wedding ceremony
solemnized by a licensed religious official.224
If an excessive entanglement claim were to be made, it would likely be
made in connection with enforcing these regulations. But the enforcement of
these regulations need not be any different than the enforcement of any other
time, place, and manner restrictions that a religious institution is subject to.
That a church is subject to building and fire codes does not create excessive
entanglement.225 Thus, the enforcement of these provisions, unlike what some
may fear, would not require the state to be best man at every wedding.
Likewise, they would not result in excessive entanglement between church and
state.

221 See id. at 606; see also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222 (1997); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825,
832 (1973); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756, 798 (1973).
222 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002); WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 95, at
214–18.
223 See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173, 177 (5th Cir. 2003) (stating that the Lemon test “remains a
required starting point in deciding contentions that state displays of symbols . . . are contrary to the First
Amendment”), aff’d, 545 U.S. 677, 689 (2005).
224 See supra Part III.
225 See, e.g., Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 696–97 (1989) (“[R]outine regulatory interaction
which involves no inquiries into religious doctrine . . . and no ‘detailed monitoring and close administrative
contact’ between secular and religious bodies, does not of itself violate the nonentanglement command.”
(citations omitted)).
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CONCLUSION
As noted in the Introduction and embodied in the discussion of these two
competing problems, the First Amendment Religion Clauses “often exert
conflicting pressures.”226 Here, the First Amendment simultaneously urges the
protection of religious officials and their communities in the exercise of their
licenses (through the Free Exercise Clause) while at the same time counseling
either that those same licenses be taken away or exercised in a particularly
acceptable manner (through the Establishment Clause). Yet this Comment has
demonstrated that it is possible to arrive in the safe “corridor between the
Religion Clauses”227 for this issue of religious officials licensed to solemnize
civil marriage.
As to the first issue of religious officials seeking the protection of the Free
Exercise Clause, this Comment has demonstrated, paradoxically, that for
licensed religious officials, the Free Exercise Clause does not provide an
exemption to a law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
in the administration of marriage solemnization licenses. Any such
antidiscrimination law would likely be found to be neutral and of general
applicability. As a result, any protection from these laws for licensed religious
officials must come from statutory or judicial exemptions. First and foremost, a
federal conscience exemption for religious officials who refuse to solemnize
same-sex marriages would be the most effective and efficient solution. But in
the absence of such a statutory exemption, licensed religious officials and their
larger faith communities should be able to claim the protections of an
expanded ministerial exception and the expressive association doctrine.
As to the establishment issue created by states licensing religious officials
to solemnize civil marriages, this Comment has demonstrated that while these
statutes do not establish a religion, there is an impermissible fusion of
governmental and religious functions at the point of solemnization—that is, in
the ceremony itself. This fusion of governmental and religious functions is also
unlikely to be protected by the longstanding historical and cultural practice
exception. Remedying this establishment problem, however, does not require a
strict separationist approach. Indeed, stripping religious officials of their
licenses to solemnize civil marriages would be to discount the faith of (1) the
religious individuals to be wed, (2) the religious officials themselves, and (3)
the larger religious communities of which these two groups are a part. Thus,
226
227

Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005).
Id. at 720.
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this Comment has proposed narrow time, place, and manner regulations
intended to unfuse the governmental and religious functions at civil wedding
ceremonies solemnized by religious officials. These regulations require two
separate ceremonies, at two different times and places, while prohibiting
language that confuses the authorities invoked in either ceremony.
Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that these regulations would also
survive constitutional challenge.
If this Comment’s thesis were adopted, much work would need to be done.
As to the free exercise issue, states need to preempt any nondiscrimination
laws by passing specific statutory exemptions protecting religious officials.
However, if a state does not pass statutory exemptions, courts should expand
the ministerial exception and the expressive association doctrine to protect
licensed religious officials.
As to the Establishment Clause issue, however, every state could face an
imminent action against the fusion of governmental and religious functions at
the typical marriage ceremony solemnized by a licensed religious official.
Thus, there is the possibility of an impending political maelstrom,
encompassing litigants, states, and religious communities. As a result of a
lawsuit, these communities would be thrust into a conversation about the
modern meaning of the Establishment Clause and its interpretation in Larkin
and its progeny. In the end, the narrow time, place, and manner restrictions this
Comment proposes would provide the most simple and narrow means by
which to remedy the establishment violation. Thus, religious communities
should be receptive of these measures to avoid the alternative strict separation
solution.
In setting forth these arguments, this Comment has sought to uphold both
of the necessary bastions of religious liberty enshrined in the First
Amendment. On the one hand, this Comment has advocated for the protection
of the religious liberty of religious officials to solemnize only those marriages
allowed by their faith. On the other hand, this Comment has argued for the
protection of religious liberty that the Establishment Clause affords to all
individuals—that no faith should be entitled to an establishment of religion.
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